

# Resolving Misunderstandings About Belief Functions

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## ABSTRACT

*Detailed answers to several critics raised by Pearl against the use of Dempster-Shafer theory to represent degrees of belief. The answers are provided within the transferable belief model interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory as developed by the author.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Belief function, transferable belief model, Dempster-Shafer theory*

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Judea Pearl has made an excellent presentation of many of the errors that pervade the belief function (BF) literature, some being put forward, even though Pearl knows their answer, for the mere purpose of provoking reactions. So it is a good opportunity for me to clarify the situation. I shall start with a summary of my interpretation of the use of belief functions to quantify someone's belief (called the transferable belief model) and follow on with a systematic refutation of Pearl's criticisms. Section and relation numbers preceded by a P refer to Pearl's presentation in the paper dealt with in this special issue.

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## 1. THE TRANSFERABLE BELIEF MODEL (TBM)

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The transferable belief model (Smets [1]) is my interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer model. It fits in essentially with Shafer's initial presentation (Shafer [2]) except inasmuch as it rejects explicitly all connections with any probabilistic model. It is based on the following assumptions:

1. Our degree of belief is quantified by a number between 0 and 1.

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2. There exists a two-level structure: a *credal* level where beliefs are entertained and a *pignistic* level where beliefs are used to make decisions.
3. Beliefs at the credal level are quantified by *belief functions*.
4. Beliefs at the pignistic level are quantified by *probability functions*.
5. The credal level precedes the pignistic level in that at any time beliefs are entertained (and updated) at the credal level, the pignistic level appearing only when a decision must be made.
6. When a *decision* must be made, beliefs at the credal level are transformed into beliefs at the pignistic level; that is, there exists a transformation, called the *pignistic transformation*, from belief functions to probability functions (Smets [3]).

To describe the TBM, one starts with  $\Omega$ , a nonempty finite set called the *frame of discernment*.  $\Omega$  is equipped with the Boolean algebra  $\mathfrak{R}$  of some of its subsets. Every element of  $\mathfrak{R}$  is called a proposition. The singletons of  $\Omega$  correspond to what I call the most specific propositions. At most one most specific proposition of  $\Omega$  corresponds to the “actual” state of affairs. The singletons of  $\Omega$  can be seen as possible answers to a certain question, at most one answer being correct. A proposition of  $\mathfrak{R}$  is implied by the most specific proposition that corresponds to the “actual” state of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

A *credal state* on  $\Omega$  is a description of our subjective, personal judgment that the propositions  $A \in \mathfrak{R}$  are true. It results from known, possibly inconclusive pieces of evidence that induce partial beliefs on the propositions of  $\mathfrak{R}$ . It is an epistemic construct as it is relative to our knowledge.

The *transferable belief model* postulates that the impact of a piece of evidence consists in allocating parts of an initial unitary amount of belief among the propositions of  $\mathfrak{R}$ . For  $A \in \mathfrak{R}$ ,  $m(A)$  is a part of our belief that supports  $A$ ; that is, that the “actual” state of affairs is in  $A$ , and, owing to lack of information, does not support any strict subproposition of  $A$ . The  $m$ ’s are called the *basic belief masses* (bbm’s).

If further evidence becomes available and implies that the proposition  $\neg B$  is false, then the mass  $m(A)$  initially allocated to  $A$  is transferred to  $A \& B$ , hence the name transferable belief model. This transfer of belief corresponds to *Dempster’s rule of conditioning* (except for the normalization factor).

## 2. Probabilities: to be or not to be

An important but often neglected distinction must be made between the following two types of *probabilistic reasoning* (P.1.3):

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<sup>1</sup> Formally for every proposition  $A$ ,  $\text{bel}(A)$  (to be read as “my belief that proposition  $A$  is true”) will quantify my belief that one of the models of proposition  $A$  corresponds to the actual state of affairs. The most specific propositions are those propositions that are satisfied only by a unique minimal model.

TYPE 1 There exists a probability function  $P: \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  where  $\mathfrak{R}$  is the finite Boolean algebra of propositions on which we rest our beliefs. But the values of  $P(A)$  for  $A \in \mathfrak{R}$  are only known to belong to some intervals whose limits are called the upper  $[P^*(A)]$  and lower  $[P_*(A)]$  probabilities. For  $\forall A \in \mathfrak{R}$ , one has

$$P_*(A) \leq P(A) \leq P^*(A) \quad (1)$$

This is essentially the *upper and lower probabilities* (ULP) model.

Dempster [4] created a similar model. He postulated the existence of a probability function  $P_X$  on some space  $X$  and a one-to-many mapping  $M$  from  $X$  to  $Y$ . The probabilities  $P_Y$  induced on  $Y$  by  $P_X$  through  $M$  are such that the lower (upper) probabilities function is a belief (plausibility) function. Up to here, Dempster's model (which I call the *PXMY model*) is merely a particular form of the ULP model.<sup>2</sup>

In both the ULP and PXMY contexts, the interval  $[P_Y^*(A), P_Y^*(A)]$  and its length for  $A \subseteq Y$  reflects the imprecision of our knowledge of  $P_Y(A)$ .

TYPE 2 No probability function is postulated to exist on  $\mathfrak{R}$ . The degree of belief given to  $A \in \mathfrak{R}$  at the credal level is quantified by a point-valued function  $\text{Bel}(A)$ . Neither additivity nor Cox's axioms are postulated. The TBM postulates the primitive concept of "part of belief," the basic belief masses (bbm's).<sup>3</sup> Such a model corresponds closely to the one described in Shafer's book.

But in more recent publications, Shafer became less radical. He accepts the existence of some underlying probability measure, but one of a very different nature than that of the ULP models.<sup>4</sup> He claims that the *meaning* of a piece of evidence is random. He speaks about the probability that the evidence means  $A$ , nor the probability that  $A$  is true. His model is essentially a PXMY model (see his translator paradigm, Shafer and Tversky [7]).

In type 2 context where underlying probability functions are not postulated, equations such as

$$\text{bel}(A) \leq P(A) \leq \text{Pl}(A) \quad (2)$$

are highly misleading. It is true that given a belief function and its associated plausibility function  $\text{Pl}$ , there exists a set of compatible probability functions  $P$  that satisfy (2), but one must resist the temptation to give any interpretation to those probability functions other than that they are mathematical objects

<sup>2</sup> Mathematically, lower probability functions are capacities of order 1. In the PXMY model the induced lower probability functions are capacities of infinite order; see Choquet [5].

<sup>3</sup> Note that undefined concepts appear also in plain probability theory; the word "probability" itself is also a primitive concept!

<sup>4</sup> Shafer's ideas, but not the solution, are similar to those defended in the evidentiary value model (Gärdenfors et al. [6]).

without relevance to our quantified belief. Only in type 1 context does the  $P$  function in (2) have a perfectly well defined relation with our belief.

Pearl's definition of *incomplete information* (P.2) is really unusual. By incomplete knowledge, I mean knowledge that is insufficient to reduce the set of possible worlds into a single element. Should I know "everything," I would know in which world I am. The lack of complete knowledge is responsible for the fact that I can only express my beliefs about which world prevails. Whether that belief should be quantified by a probability function or a belief function is obviously the crucial question.

Strat's [8] statement quoted by Pearl is indeed unfortunate as it leads one to believe that belief functions should be used for "unavailable probabilities." If "unavailable" means "it exists but we don't know its value," then the ULP model is to be used. If "unavailable" means "it doesn't exist," then Strat is correct. Pearl's discussion and comments result from the inappropriate use of belief functions for typical ULP problems, a confusion unfortunately shared by many users of belief function theory.

The lesson to be derived from this distinction is that the TBM is not a model for *poorly known* probabilities. For this case the appropriate model is the ULP model—maybe under the PXMY form, if one can explain the origin of its components. The TBM is a model that uses whatever is available, not a model to be used when some probabilities are missing. The reason for this formulation is that people will usually interpret the idea of "missing probabilities" not as *absent* probabilities but as *existing* probabilities whose values are missing. The correct statement should read more like "the TBM is a model in which we are ignorant of the existence of probabilities (whereas the ULP models are models in which we know of the existence of probabilities but are ignorant of their values).

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### 3. STATIC AND DYNAMIC COMPONENTS

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To study any model for quantified belief, one must consider not only its *static component* (how are beliefs allocated?) but also its *dynamic component* (how are beliefs updated?). In the TBM, the static component corresponds to the bbm allocation, and the dynamic component to (1) the *transfer* of those basic belief masses among the propositions and (2) the *combination* of the beliefs induced by several pieces of evidence.

It must be emphasized that any comparison of the TBM with other models must consider both components. Far too often, authors concentrate on the static component and discover many relations between the TBM and ULP models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and Halpern [9]), random sets (Nguyen [10]), probabilities of provability (Pearl [11]) (P.1.4), probabilities of necessity (Ruspini [12]), etc. But these authors usually do not explain or justify the dynamic component, that is, how updating (conditioning) is to be handled

(except in some cases by defining conditioning as a special case of combination). So I feel that these partial comparisons are incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead to different updating rules.

### Updating—Combination: Which Comes First?

Shafer presents his model by introducing successively (1) the static component (the belief functions), (2) the combination process (Dempster's rule of combination), and (3) the updating process (Dempster's rule of conditioning) as a particular case of the combination process. We present the TBM by introducing successively (1) the static component (the basic belief masses), (2) the updating process (the mass transfer), and (3) the combination process that we derive from the previous processes by requiring essentially the compositionality of the combination (i.e.,  $\text{bel}_1 \oplus \text{bel}_2$  is only a function of  $\text{bel}_1$  and  $\text{bel}_2$ ) (Smets [13]). I think this order of presentation of the TBM is more natural.

Updating by a true fact (P.1.3) is the most fundamental dynamic component. Later, one introduces the concept of updating by uncertain facts [as with Jeffrey's rule of conditioning (Jeffrey [14], Shafer [15])] and finally the concept of combining symmetrically two belief functions induced by two "distinct" pieces of evidence. That the two updating processes turn out to be mathematically special forms of Dempster's rule of combination is not required by the model.

To show why I believe that the updating process precedes the combination process, let us examine the equivalent processes within the *probabilistic framework*. Remember that if both belief functions  $\text{bel}_1$  and  $\text{bel}_2$  are probability functions  $P_1$  and  $P_2$ , then Dempster's rule of combination can be reduced to  $m_{12}(x) = P_{12}(x) = \alpha P_1(x)P_2(x)$  for  $x \in \Omega$  if (1) there are equal a priori probabilities on  $\Omega$  and (2) the two pieces of evidence that induced  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are conditionally independent for each  $x \in \Omega$ . If one tries to define the conditioning as a special case of combination, the conditional probability  $P(x|X)$  is no longer defined as  $P(x)/P(X)$  for  $x \in X$ . It is defined as the result of the combination (with the equal prior and the conditional independence being postulated) of the probability function  $P$  with a probability function  $P'$  such that  $P'(x) = 1/|X|$  for  $x \in X$  and 0 otherwise. Can such a new definition of the conditional probability be regarded as acceptable? It is mathematically correct but looks faintly surrealistic. To claim that conditioning with belief functions is a special form of combination is one and the same thing, and that is why I am not in favor of that kind of approach.

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## 4. WHAT IS TBM NOT?

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The TBM is not a model based on random sets or on upper and lower probabilities. They share the same static components but not the dynamic ones.

With random sets, conditioning should be performed by the application of the geometric rules (Suppes and Zanotti [16]), except in very twisted cases (Smets [17]). With upper and lower probabilities, the G-rule<sup>5</sup> is usually appropriate.

A very important element of the TBM is its total lack of connection with any concept of randomness or additive probabilities. Whenever randomness (or decision) is involved, additive probabilities are, of course, perfectly appropriate, but this context is not the one covered by the TBM. In the TBM context (belief entertained outside any context of randomness or decision process), the use of additive probabilities to quantify our beliefs could be justified by axioms like those of Cox [19]. Cox Axiom 1 states that the belief of the negation of a proposition should be a function of the belief of the proposition

$$\text{belief}(\neg A) = f(\text{belief}(A))$$

Cox's axiom is too strong and not postulated in the TBM, and therefore the additive probabilities derived from it are not required in the TBM.

I also dissociate the TBM from the PXMY model because Dempster's rule of conditioning can be criticized in the latter case. Why indeed should one apply Dempster's rule of conditioning in a PXMY context? (Levi [20]). When the truth is known to be mapped into a subset  $Z$  of  $Y$ , Dempster adapts the  $M$  mapping accordingly but does not update the initial probability distribution  $P$  on  $X$  by taking the new fact  $Z$  into account. I developed the TBM as a model totally unlinked to any underlying probability model just to avoid any such criticism. When I build a belief function on some space  $Y$ , I never postulate the existence of some space  $X$  endowed with a probability function and of a one-to-many mapping from  $X$  to  $Y$ .

Beware nevertheless that the Bayesian analysis is always a particular case of the TBM analysis (P.5). The conclusions reached by a Bayesian analysis require more information than those reached by a TBM analysis. The fact is that in order to perform the Bayesian analysis, many probabilities must be specified on top of those used by the TBM analysis, and, of course, these *extra specifications* lead to results different from those reached by a TBM analysis that does not use them. If these extra specifications had also been introduced in the TBM analysis, both analyses would have led to the same results. In fact, all results derived from a Bayesian analysis can also be obtained from a TBM analysis if the same information is used in both analyses.

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<sup>5</sup> The G-rule of conditioning is what Pearl calls FH conditioning [P.3.3, Eq. (19)]. Its description can be found in Dempster [4]. I called it the G-rule as I traced the work on upper and lower probabilities to Good's papers. (See also Planchet [18].)

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## 5. OPEN OR CLOSED WORLDS?

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In [1] I explain the difference between the open- and closed-world assumptions. Reconsider the definition of  $\Omega$  in Section 1. I postulate either that *at most one* most specific proposition of  $\Omega$  is true (open-world assumption) or that *one and only one* most specific proposition of  $\Omega$  is true (closed-world assumption). The *normalization* results from the closed-world assumption. Shafer postulates the closed-world assumption. I generalize the problem, accept that both contexts could exist, and select the appropriate assumption according to the problem under scrutiny (P.1.3.3).

Pearl could easily have generalized his description of Dempster's rule of combination in P.1.4 by dropping the statement "given that the two pieces of evidence are noncontradictory" or "to condition beliefs on the evidence being noncontradictory." Distinguishing between the open- and closed-world contexts would have solved the "counterexamples" in P.1.4, for which the paradoxical results are due to the normalization factor. His criticisms on the adequacy of Dempster's rule of conditioning concern the normalization problem more than the rule itself. Under an open-world assumption, there is no normalization when both of Dempster's rules are being applied.

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## 6. BELIEF ABOUT UNKNOWN PROBABILITIES

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The three examples in P.2.1 and the remarks in P.2.2 are irrelevant to belief functions; they are ULP problems. They correspond to the type 1 context as explained in Section 2. To grasp the origin of the confusion, let us analyze Example 1, the other two being solved identically.

In Example 1 of P.2.1,  $\Omega$  is the simplex  $ABC$  (Figure 1) characterized by all three element vectors  $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$  where  $x_i \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^3 x_i = 1$ . [ $x_i$  represents the unknown  $P(E_i)$ .] The three pieces of evidence are  $x_i \in [0, 0.5]$ ,  $i = 1, 2, 3$ . For instance, the first piece of evidence induces a belief function with basic belief masses  $m_1(AbaB) = 1$  (see Figure 1). The second and third pieces of evidence induce the basic belief masses  $m_2(CacA) = 1$  and  $m_3(BcbC) = 1$ . Their combination by Dempster's rule of combination leads to  $m_{123}(abc) = 1$ . So any point in the triangle  $abc$  is a solution to the problem raised in Example 1. Similar results are derived if one considers the three inequalities of Pearl's Eq. (7) as a single piece of evidence that says only that the solution is in the triangle  $abc$ .

The object language of the probabilities deals with the events  $E_i$ . The object language of our belief deals with the vectors of probabilities (points in the simplex  $ABC$ ). The belief statements do not concern the events  $E_i$ . An open question is how to build your beliefs on  $E_i$  given your beliefs on their




Figure 1. Simplex  $ABC$ .

probabilities. The metalanguage (our belief statements) expresses our knowledge about which “object” (vector of probabilities) is true. Example 1 and the other two confuse the two levels.

The introduction of  $\text{bbm } m_i$  is, of course, not very useful in these examples. So in order to show what the differences between the object language and the metalanguage really is, I shall generalize the problem raised in Example 1 by considering, for example, that the  $\text{bbm's } m_1$  are

$$m_1(Ab'a'B) = 0.3 \quad m_1(AbaB) = 0.4, \quad m_1(Ab''a''B) = 0.2, \\ m_1(ABC) = 0.1$$

which translates as, for example,

I believe at level 0.3 that  $P(E_1) \leq 0.25$

I believe at level 0.7 that  $P(E_1) \leq 0.50$

I believe at level 0.9 that  $P(E_1) \leq 0.75$

I believe at level 0.6 that  $0.25 \leq P(E_1) \leq 0.75$  etc.

If similar  $\text{bbm's}$  had been obtained for  $m_2$  and  $m_3$ , then the full strength of the TBM could be realized. Many errors, like those of Pearl's three examples, derive from the fact that each belief function is characterized by one focal element and the expression  $\text{bel}[P(E_1) \leq 0.5] = 1$  is translated into  $\text{bel}(E_1) = 0.5$ . A belief about a probability of an event is not identical to a belief about the event. In these examples, the belief functions are analogous to the metaprobabilities (probabilities of order 2).

As to the remark after Eq. (8) in P.2.1, I agree that the function defined by (P7) is not a belief function, but then I never claimed that lower probability functions are belief functions. They are unrelated.  $P_*$  expresses one thing, Bel another.



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## 7. THE UNSPOILING OF THE SANDWICH

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The sandwich principle raised in P.2.2, Example 4, and P.3.2 can be stated as

$$\text{bel}(A) \in [\text{bel}(A | B), \text{bel}(A | \neg B)] \quad (3)$$

It is an important issue that must be solved as (3) is not required with the TBM. I shall present an example in which (3) seems not to be required, proceed to explain the relation between  $\text{bel}(A)$ ,  $\text{bel}(A | B)$ , and  $\text{bel}(A | \neg B)$  as deduced from the generalized Bayes theorem and then why (3) is not required within the TBM, and, finally, answer a few specific questions raised by Pearl.

### 7.1. Examples Against the Sandwich Principle

Suppose a given person  $X$  who can be either male ( $M$ ) or female ( $F$ ), young ( $Y$ ) or old. I try to assess my belief that  $X$  is young.

Consider the following pieces of evidence.

$E_1$ : A not fully reliable witness  $W_1$  claims he saw  $X$  and says: “ $X$  is not an old man.” By “not fully reliable” I mean that maybe  $W_1$  saw  $X$  and is telling the truth about  $X$ , or maybe he did not see  $X$  and saw somebody else.

$E_2$ : Another not fully reliable witness  $W_2$  says: “ $X$  is not an old woman.”

$M$  I know that  $X$  is a man.

$F$ : I know that  $X$  is a woman.

For simplicity's sake, let us accept that the reliabilities of both witnesses are the same and that our prior belief about  $X$ 's age is independent of our knowledge about  $X$ 's sex.

How would I compare  $\text{bel}_{12}(Y)$  and  $\text{bel}_{1M}(Y)$  where

$\text{bel}_{12}(Y)$  is the belief that  $X$  is young given  $E_1$  and  $E_2$ .

$\text{bel}_{1M}(Y)$  is the belief that  $X$  is young given  $E_1$  and  $M$ .

Which of the following relations is more natural?

$$\text{bel}_{12}(Y) = \text{bel}_{1M}(Y) \quad (4)$$

$$\text{bel}_{12}(Y) < \text{bel}_{1M}(Y) \quad (5)$$

$\text{bel}_{1M}(Y)$  reflects the fact that  $X$  is male (known for sure) and  $W_1$  was reliable when he said that “ $X$  is not an old man.” So  $\text{bel}_{1M}(Y)$  is related to the reliability given to  $W_1$ .  $\text{bel}_{12}(Y)$  results from the combination of the pieces

of evidence provided by the two witnesses. If both witnesses are reliable, then  $X$  is young. Otherwise I do not know. So  $\text{bel}_{12}(Y)$  is related to the fact that both  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  are reliable.

I personally feel that (4) is not required and (5) is more appropriate. But once (5) is accepted, it is proved below that

$$\text{bel}_{12}(Y) < \min[\text{bel}_{12M}(Y), \text{bel}_{12F}(Y)] \quad (6)$$

where  $\text{bel}_{12M}(Y)$  and  $\text{bel}_{12F}(Y)$  are, respectively, the beliefs that  $X$  is young given the pieces of evidence  $E_1$ ,  $E_2$ , and  $M$  or  $F$ . They correspond, in fact, to the conditional beliefs that  $X$  is young given  $X$  is male or female (and  $E_1$  and  $E_2$ ).

So the inequality (6) contradicts the “sandwich” principle described in (3) (P.3.2) because (6) is equivalent to

$$\text{bel}_{12}(Y) < \min[\text{bel}_{12}(Y | M), \text{bel}_{12}(Y | F)]$$

**PROOF THAT (5) IMPLIES (6)** The symmetry of the reliabilities implies that  $\text{bel}_{1M} = \text{bel}_{2F}$ , so (5) becomes  $\text{bel}_{12}(Y) < \text{bel}_{2F}(Y)$ . Once  $M$  is known,  $E_2$  becomes a tautology, so  $\text{bel}_{1M} = \text{bel}_{12M}$ . Identically,  $\text{bel}_{2F} = \text{bel}_{12F}$ . Replacing  $\text{bel}_{1M}$  and  $\text{bel}_{2F}$  in (5), one gets (6). ■

In conclusion, the sandwich principle might seem natural, though I think my example casts some doubt on any such naturalness. If you accept the sandwich principle, you must accept (4). [In fact, (4) results from a Bayesian analysis, whereas (5) results from a TBM analysis.]

As another example, suppose you have three potential killers,  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ . Each can use a gun or a knife. I shall select one of them, but you will not know how I select the killer. The killer selects his weapon by a random process with  $p(\text{gun}) = 0.2$  and  $p(\text{knife}) = 0.8$ . Each of  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $C$  has his own personal random device, the random devices are unrelated, and it just so happens they share the same probabilities (the 0.2 values).

Suppose you are Bayesian and must express your “belief” that the killer will use a gun. The BF solution gives  $\text{Bel}(\text{gun}) = 0.2 \times 0.2 \times 0.2 = 0.008$ . What about you? Would you defend 0.2? But this applies only if I select the killer with a random device (in which case the BF solution also gives 0.2 as a result). But I never said I would use a random device; I might be a very hostile player and cheat whenever I can.

So before assigning the killing to  $A$ ,  $B$ , or  $C$ , I will order each of them to note, on a piece of paper, the weapon they would use if selected. They use their personal random device and note the name of the weapon they would use if selected. Suppose I am a hostile player. In that case, I would do whatever I could to show that your prediction about the weapon used is wrong. You express your belief about the gun, so if I can, I will assign the killing to somebody who wrote “knife” on his paper (I just look at the papers). So what

is the “chance” I cannot beat you? What is the probability that whatever I do you win? Answer: The chance that all three killers wrote “gun”: 0.008.

So your 0.008 belief for gun corresponds to the strength of your belief that whatever selection procedure I use—even the most hostile—you will win if you bet on “gun.”

So you could interpret  $\text{bel}(x)$  as the probability that you are sure to win whatever Mother Nature (however hostile) will do [and  $\text{Pl}(x) = 1 - (0.8 \times 0.8 \times 0.8)$  then corresponds to what a most friendly Nature would do]. The betting behavior proposed by Stratt [8] is, in fact, based on these ideas.

## 7.2. Marginal Beliefs Based on Conditional Beliefs

Let  $\Omega_A$  and  $\Omega_B$  be two finite frames of discernment. Let  $\mathfrak{R}_A$  be an algebra on  $\Omega_A$ . Let  $\mathfrak{B} = \{B_i; i = 1, \dots, n\}$ , where the  $B_i$  are the most specific propositions of  $\Omega_B$ . Suppose one knows  $\text{Bel}(A | B_i)$  for each  $A \in \mathfrak{R}_A$  and each  $B_i \in \mathfrak{B}$ . Suppose the conditional belief functions are distinct. Let  $\mathfrak{R}_B$  be an algebra on  $\Omega_B$ . Given some prior belief  $\text{Bel}_0$  on  $\mathfrak{R}_B$  (with bbm  $m_0$ ), then the marginal  $\text{bel}(A) = \text{bel}(A | \bigcup_{i=1}^n B_i)$  defined on  $\mathfrak{R}_A$  is

$$\text{bel}(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathfrak{R}_B} \left\{ m_0(B) \prod_{B_i \in \mathfrak{B}; B_i \subseteq B} \text{bel}(A | B_i) \right\} \quad (7)$$

(This relation is deduced from the so-called conditional embedding underlying the *generalized Bayes theorem*; see Smets [21–25] and Shafer [26].)

In Pearl’s Example 4, I consider that I am in a state of total ignorance as regards  $\Omega_B$ ; hence, by (7),

$$\text{bel}(A) = \text{bel}(A | B)\text{bel}(A | \neg B) \leq \min[\text{bel}(A | B), \text{bel}(A | \neg B)]$$

## 7.3. Why Is the Sandwich Principle Not Required?

Let  $\text{cyl}(A)$ ,  $\text{cyl}(B)$ , and  $\text{cyl}(\neg B)$  be the cylindric extensions of  $A \in \mathfrak{R}_A$ ,  $B$ , and  $\neg B \in \mathfrak{R}_B$  on the Cartesian product  $\Omega = \Omega_A \times \Omega_B$ . Let  $\text{bel}_\Omega$  be the Belief function defined on  $\Omega$  that could generate the various  $\text{bel}(A)$ ,  $\text{bel}(A | B)$ , and  $\text{bel}(A | \neg B)$  by marginalization or conditioning.

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{bel}(A) &= \text{bel}_\Omega[\text{cyl}(A) | \text{cyl}(B) \vee \text{cyl}(\neg B)] \\ \text{bel}(A | B) &= \text{bel}_\Omega[\text{cyl}(A) | \text{cyl}(B)] \\ \text{bel}(A | \neg B) &= \text{bel}_\Omega[\text{cyl}(A) | \text{cyl}(\neg B)] \end{aligned}$$

All these belief functions concern the same event on  $\Omega[\text{cyl}(A)]$ , but the last two result from some updating on some true facts [ $\text{cyl}(B)$  and  $\text{cyl}(\neg B)$ ]. In the

latter two cases we know more than in the first. It seems reasonable to accept that in some context the more we know the stronger our belief could be.<sup>6</sup> Each piece of evidence [the one inducing the updating on  $\text{cyl}(B)$  and the one inducing the updating on  $\text{cyl}(\neg B)$ ] induces some information about  $\text{cyl}(A)$ . That the resulting beliefs on  $A$  [ $\text{bel}(A | B)$  and  $\text{bel}(A | \neg B)$ ] are increased in both cases ( $\min[\text{bel}(A | B), \text{bel}(A | \neg B)] \geq \text{bel}(A)$ ) becomes perfectly acceptable. In particular, when we know nothing, our belief is vacuous, and it will increase by the accumulation of new pieces of evidence. So our belief in  $\text{cyl}(A)$  increases also once we know that  $B$  is true (or that  $\neg B$  is true).

In fact, suppose one knows there is no a priori whatsoever on  $\mathfrak{B}$ ; then (7) becomes

$$\text{bel}(A) = \prod_{i=1}^n \text{bel}(A | B_i) \quad (8)$$

Hence with large  $n$ ,  $\text{bel}(A)$  tends in general toward a vacuous belief function, which I consider to be perfectly reasonable. Should I have some probabilistic a priori on  $\mathfrak{B}$ , then  $\text{bel}(A)$  would be some weighted average of the  $\text{bel}(A | B_i)$  (as required by the sandwich principle). But when the belief on  $\mathfrak{B}$  is vacuous, the principle does not hold. That  $\text{bel}(A)$  tends to 0 reflects the fact that  $\text{cyl}(A)$  is hardly supported when  $n$  is large.

#### 7.4. Further Considerations

1. The conclusions at the end of the second paragraph of P.2.2 are wrong. I agree that *conditional beliefs*  $\text{bel}(A | B_i)$  for  $A$  in  $\Omega_A$  within each context  $B_i \in \mathfrak{B}$  are usually the real foundation for expressing *expert opinions* and that there is no prior over the space  $\mathfrak{R}_B$ . Our generalized Bayes theorem was developed with exactly that idea in mind. Pearl's criticism is inappropriate. It results, of course, from his erroneous requirement of relation (3).
2. Consider the pork-eating problem (P.2.3, reasoning by cases). Again see relation (8) for the origin of the 0.63 result. Furthermore, one should be very careful when subdividing a category (the Jews) into subcategories. One must remember that relation (8) must be respected. Pearl's data 0.7, imply that there is an a priori basic belief mass  $m$  on the four subcategories (OJ, CJ, RJ, NAJ) among the Jews such that

$$\begin{aligned} 0.70 = & 0.999m(\text{OJ}) + 0.8m(\text{CJ}) + 0.4m(\text{RJ}) + 0.2m(\text{NAJ}) \\ & + (0.999)(0.8)m(\text{OJ} \vee \text{CJ}) + \cdots + (0.999)(0.8)(0.4) \\ & \times (0.2)m(\text{OJ} \vee \text{CJ} \vee \text{RJ} \vee \text{NAJ}) \end{aligned}$$

<sup>6</sup> This argument does not mean that  $\text{bel}(A)$  will always increase as new pieces of evidence become known, as the latter could also be in contradiction with  $A$ .

How to derive  $m$  is still an open question. Should we apply the least commitment principle as advocated by Dubois and Prade, or minimized some measure of information (Smets [27])?

## 8. De re and de dicto Conditionals

Pearl (P.2.2 and P.2.3) raises the problems of the quantified conditional, already studied by Harper et al. [28]. In fact, most problems come from the ambiguity of the proposition:

$$\text{“I believe that } A \text{ implies } B \text{ at level } p\text{”} \quad (9)$$

This could be translated into

If  $A$  then  $[\text{belief}(B) = p]$ ,  $A \supseteq [\text{bel}_A(B) = p]$  de re interpretation

or

Belief(if  $A$  then  $B$ ) =  $p$ ,  $\text{bel}(A \supseteq B) = p$  de dicto interpretation

I call these two interpretations the *de re* and *de dicto* interpretations (Smets et al. [29]).

The implication  $A \supseteq B$  is translated as a *material implication*  $\neg A \vee B$ .  $\text{Bel}_A(B)$  denotes the belief given to  $B$  in a context where  $A$  is true. It corresponds to  $\text{bel}(B | A)$ .

With a belief function one has

$$\begin{aligned} \text{bel}_A(B) = \text{bel}(B | A) &= \frac{\text{bel}(\neg A \vee B) - \text{bel}(\neg A)}{1 - \text{bel}(\neg A)} \\ &= \text{bel}(\neg A \vee B) = \text{bel}(A \supseteq B) \end{aligned}$$

if  $\text{bel}(\neg A) = 0$ , an accepted requirement as it only translates the idea that the knowledge of an implication should not induce any a priori belief on the antecedent domain. *The de re and de dicto interpretations lead to the same results*—a nice property that resolves most (if not all) conflicts related to the concept of probability of conditionals versus conditional probabilities (Lewis [30]).

A particular case is raised in Pearl’s footnote 5: If all we know is  $\text{bel}(\text{If } B \text{ then } A) = p$ , then the use of  $\text{bel}(B \supset A) = \text{bel}(\neg B \vee A) = p$  leads to the results derived by the deconditionalization process (called conditional embedding in Shafer [26]) ([see relation (7) with  $m(A | B) = p$ ]).

Using deconditionalization [see Eq.(7)], one can solve the case where I know that

$$\text{I believe at level } p_i \text{ that } B_i \text{ implies } A_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

with  $B_i \in \mathfrak{B}$  and  $A_i \in \mathfrak{R}_A$  (see P.2.2). Each uncertain implication is translated into the simple support functions with  $m_i(\neg B_i \vee A_i) = p_i$  and combined via Dempster's rule of combination.

Suppose that  $B \in \mathfrak{R}_B$  is known to be true. Then from (7) the belief function induced on  $A \in \mathfrak{B}_A$  by “ $B$  is true” and the set of uncertain implications is

$$\text{bel}(A | B) = \prod_{B_i \in B} \text{bel}(A | B_i) = \prod_{i: B_i \in B} c_i p_i \quad (10)$$

with  $c_i = 1$  if  $A_i \subseteq A$  and 0 otherwise.

It is a pity that these formulas [(7) and its special case (10)] never became very popular. In actual fact, they were completely ignored. Let us hope that the present papers will help to promote them.

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## 9. CONSTRAINTS OR COMBINATIONS

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I would like to introduce another problem concerning the meaning to be given to the available information on our belief (P.2.3).

**SITUATION 1** With probability theory, one usually postulates the existence of some underlying probability function on some space and all pieces of evidence correspond to some constraints on this probability function [e.g., I know  $P(A)$  and  $P(B)$  but not  $P(A \& B)$  as in P.2.1 Example 2].

**SITUATION 2** With belief function theory, it is usually postulated that each piece of evidence induces a belief function on some space, that they are distinct (a concept that incidentally still requires a formalized definition), and that they must be combined through Dempster's rule of combination.

The two situations are totally different.

The first situation can also be encountered with belief functions even though I do not think it is often relevant. This is what Pearl tries to solve in P.2.1, Examples 1 and 2. In such partly defined belief functions, one can always try to apply the *minimum commitment* approach of Dubois and Prade [31], that is, find the least committed belief function that satisfies the given constraints where  $\text{bel}_1$  is less committed than  $\text{bel}_2$  if  $\text{bel}_1(A) \leq \text{bel}_2(A) \forall A$  in  $\Omega$ .

The second situation can also be encountered with probability functions, but it raises the problem of how to *aggregate probabilities* (Genest and Zidek, [32]).

For instance, in (P.2.3, reasoning by cases) one must distinguish between the fact that Pearl's Eqs. (11) are either (1) two constraints on the same underlying belief function—in which case  $\text{bel}(B | A) = 0.9$  and  $\text{bel}(B | \neg A) = 0.7$  and the least committed underlying belief function is such that  $m(B) = 0.6$ ,  $m(A \vee B) = 0.1$ , and  $m(\neg A \vee B) = 0.3$ —or (2) produced by two

distinct pieces of evidence, in which case one will obtain  $\text{bel}(B) = 0.63$  by the application of Eq. (8) of the present paper. That solution does not run counter to common sense, as explained in Section 7.

## 10. TWEETY SPLASHED BY THE SPRINKLER WHILE EATING HIS SANDWICH<sup>7</sup>

Tweety and the sprinkler examples deserve a full TBM analysis in order to avoid the erroneous conclusions derived from shallow analysis.

### Tweety Is an Atypical Bird

The TBM analysis of the *Tweety problem* is the following. Let  $\mathfrak{B} = \{\text{TB}, \text{NTB}, \text{NB}\}$  where TB = typical bird, NTB = nontypical bird, and NB = non-bird. Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{F, \neg F\}$ , where  $F$  = “it flies.” The data are presented in Table 1. They translate as

In general, typical birds fly.

In general, nontypical birds do not fly.

In general, non-birds do not fly.

Furthermore, “in general, birds are typical birds” [ $\text{bel}(\text{TB} \mid \neg \text{NB}) = \delta$ ].  $\delta$  is the bbm given to  $\text{TB} \cup \text{NB}$  that is transferred to TB by the conditioning on  $\neg \text{NB}$ .

CASE 1 Let it be known that Tweety is a bird. The application of (7) implies that

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\text{bel}(F \mid \text{TB} \vee \text{NTB}) \\
 &\quad = m(\text{TB} \mid \text{TB} \vee \text{NTB})\text{bel}(F \mid \text{TB}) \\
 &\quad \quad + m(\text{NTB} \mid \text{TB} \vee \text{NTB})\text{bel}(F \mid \text{NTB}) \\
 &\quad \quad + m(\text{NB} \mid \text{TB} \vee \text{NTB})\text{bel}(F \mid \text{NB}) \\
 &\quad = \delta\alpha \\
 &\text{bel}(\neg F \mid \text{TB} \vee \text{NTB}) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

**Table 1.** Basic Belief Masses Allocated to  $F$  and  $\neg F$  Given TB, NTB, and NB

	TB	NTB	NB
$F$	$\alpha$	0	0
$\neg F$	0	$\beta$	$\gamma$

<sup>7</sup> P.2.3, chaining and Example 5.

CASE 2 Let it be known that Tweety is a penguin and all penguins are NTB. Then by (7),

$$\text{bel}(F | \text{NTB}) = 0$$

$$\text{bel}(\neg F | \text{NTB}) = \beta$$

and Tweety is still a bird as it should [ $\text{bel}(\text{NTB}) = 1$ , so  $\text{bel}(\text{TB} \vee \text{NTB}) = 1$ ]. Who said that belief function theory is essentially a theory of monotonic logic? (See P.2.2.)

CASE 3 Let it be known that Titi is a typical bird. Thus by (7),  $\text{bel}(F | \text{TB}) = \alpha$ ,  $\text{bel}(\neg F | \text{TB}) = 0$ , and  $\text{bel}(B) = 1$ . Hence our belief that typical birds fly is greater than our belief that birds fly, which is required (but not always derived in the penguin analysis).

The TBM analysis of the Tweety example (and *rules subject to exceptions*) deserves a fuller treatment (see Smets and Hsia [33]). As shown in Case 2, the facts “Tweety is a penguin” and “Tweety is a bird” lead to  $\text{bel}(F) = 0$  and  $\text{bel}(\neg F) = \beta$ , not to a vacuous belief function as claimed by Pearl (P.5).

### Sprinkler Is On and It Does Not Rain

The *sprinkler problem* is indeed a tricky one, but so it is with many probabilistic problems (see Székely [34]).

Let

$$\begin{array}{ll} S = \text{“Sprinkler was on”} & \mathcal{S} = \{S, \neg S\} \\ R = \text{“It rained”} & \mathcal{R} = \{R, \neg R\} \\ W = \text{“Ground is wet”} & \mathcal{W} = \{W, \neg W\} \end{array}$$

$$\text{bel}_1(S \supseteq W) = 1$$

$$\text{bel}_2(R \supseteq W) = 1$$

$$\text{bel}_3(W \supseteq S \vee R) = 1$$

$$\text{bel}_4(\neg S) = \alpha$$

The belief functions express that the antecedents “Sprinkler was on” ( $\text{bel}_1$ ) or “It rained” ( $\text{bel}_2$ ) imply the consequent “Ground is wet” and no other causes could be invoked ( $\text{bel}_3$ ).  $\text{bel}_4$  expresses that usually sprinklers are not on.

The vacuous extension of the four belief functions on the product space  $\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{W}$  and their combination induces the belief function whose basic



belief masses are

$$m((\neg W, \neg S, \neg R) \vee (W, \neg S, R)) = \alpha$$

$$m((\neg W, \neg S, \neg R) \vee (W, S, \neg R) \vee (W, \neg S, R) \vee (W, S, R)) = 1 - \alpha$$

By conditioning on  $S$ ,  $\alpha$  is transferred to  $\emptyset$ , and  $1 - \alpha$  is transferred to  $(W, S)$ . So after normalization,  $\text{bel}(S) = 1$ ,  $\text{bel}(W) = 1$ , and  $\text{bel}(R) = 0$ , as it should.

By conditioning on  $W$ ,  $\alpha$  is transferred to  $(W, \neg S, R)$  and  $1 - \alpha$  to  $(W, S, \neg R) \vee (W, \neg S, R) \vee (W, S, R)$ . So  $\text{bel}(W) = 1$  and  $\text{bel}(R) = \alpha$ , which translates the idea that “Ground is wet” suggests “It rained.”

The paradoxes described by Pearl do not exist when belief functions are used correctly.

### The Peter, Paul, and Mary Sandwich<sup>8</sup>

Consider the product space  $C \times S$  where  $C = \{H, T\}$  and  $S = \{h, t\}$  (translation: Coin, Head, Tail, Sandwich, ham, turkey). Let the four elements of  $C \times S$  be  $a = (H, h)$ ,  $b = (H, t)$ ,  $c = (T, h)$ ,  $d = (T, t)$ . The problem is to build a belief function on  $C \times S$ . We know that  $\text{Pr}(H) = \text{Pr}(T) = \text{bel}(T) = 0.5$ . [I think we should always accept Hacking’s frequency principle: If  $\text{Pr}(x) = p$  then  $\text{bel}(x) = p$ .] So on  $C \times S$ ,

$$\text{bel}(a \cup b) = \text{bel}(c \cup d) = 0.5.$$

Next what are  $\text{bel}(H | h)$  and  $\text{bel}(H | t)$ ? The first remark is that they must satisfy the constraint

$$' \text{bel}(H | h) = x ' \equiv ' \text{bel}(H | t) = x '$$

whatever  $x$  (here  $x = 0.5$ ). The only way to build a belief function on  $C \times S$  such that this constraint is always satisfied is to allocate the basic belief masses on  $C \times S$  such that  $m(a \cup b) = m(c \cup d) = 0.5$ . It satisfies all constraints [the one relative to  $\text{bel}(a \cup b)$  and the very strong “correlation”  $' \text{bel}(H | h) = x ' \equiv ' \text{bel}(H | t) = x '$ ].

What is the chance that Paul will win \$1000? To win ( $W$ ) is equivalent to obtaining  $a \cup d$ . If Paul knows that the sandwich is  $h$ , then his chance of winning is 0.5. (and the same for turkey). (One has  $\text{bel}(W | h) = \text{bel}(H | h) = \text{Pr}(H | h) = 0.5$ , etc.)

If Paul does not know which sandwich was prepared, then  $\text{bel}(W) = \text{bel}(a \cup d) = 0 = \text{bel}(\neg W) = \text{bel}(b \cup c)$ . But if Paul must bet on  $W$ , which, of course, is his real problem (the \$1000 attests to it), then Paul builds his

<sup>8</sup> P.3.2, Example 5.

pignistic probabilities on  $C \times S$  by applying my pignistic transformation [3]. The 0.5 basic belief mass given to  $a \cup b$  is split equally between  $a$  and  $b$  (and the same for the other 0.5). So each singleton of  $C \times S$  receives a BetP of 0.25, and  $\text{BetP}(W) = \text{BetP}(a) + \text{BetP}(d) = 0.5$ , as requested by Pearl.

### Other Paradoxes

Most paradoxes raised by Pearl in P.2.3 (contraposition) are paradoxes related to the translation of  $\text{IF} \dots \text{THEN}$  by material implications. *They exist in logic* and are unrelated to the use of belief functions.

I consider it logically correct to state “If you are hungry, you haven’t eaten cakes.” That it is not a useful statement is irrelevant. One should be careful not to confuse *truth* and *usefulness*.

With regard to the bird, in a world with “only” birds, the translation of “typical birds fly” has to be done as with Tweety. Two categories must be created: Typical birds (those who usually fly) and Nontypical birds (those who usually do not fly). The paradox then disappears.

With the *kind person*, if all I know are the two rules given by Pearl, then I cannot understand Pearl’s conclusion. I feel that it is perfectly reasonable to believe that Joe is unkind (with strength  $m^2$ ). Note that the same conclusion (and Pearl’s dissatisfaction) would appear in plain logic. Given the two rules,  $F$  will imply  $\neg K$ . To avoid such a conclusion—as seems to be Pearl’s intention—there must be further rules. If someone would only tell me what they are, I would include them in the TBM analysis. Dissatisfaction with BF models is often due to the fact that only some rules are considered, which then lead to unsatisfactory conclusions. But the reason these conclusions are unsatisfactory is that there are extra constraints we would like to see fulfilled but did not include in our initial analysis. Introduce them in the TBM analysis, and the results will be satisfactory.

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## 11. THE THREE PRISONERS PROBLEM

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The *three prisoners problem* (P3.1) is a nice problem that deserves a TBM analysis. Let  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$ , and  $A_3$  be the three prisoners. Everybody knows that one prisoner is going to be executed and two are going to be saved. I ( $A_1$ ) call the guard and ask him to give me the name of one of the other two prisoners who is going to be saved. He answers  $A_3$ . Should I change my belief that I will be executed given that I know that  $A_3$  is going to be saved?

Before I ask the guard, my belief that the executed prisoner  $S$  was  $A_1$  was  $\text{bel}(S = A_1) = 1/3$ . It was based on the accepted idea that the judge would randomly select (with probability  $1/3$ ) the prisoner who would be executed. Two situations could then be considered.

CONTEXT 1 The guard looked over the judge's shoulder, saw the result of the selection, came to my cell, and told me " $A_3$  is saved." This is equivalent to saying " $A_3$  was not selected": Conditioning on  $\neg A_3$  seems to be realistic. Hence my belief that I would be executed increased to  $1/2$ .

$$\text{bel}(S = A_1 \mid S \neq A_3) = 1/2$$

This is how the solution disliked by Pearl is arrived at. But it does not correspond to the context that concerns Pearl. The context that Pearl uses is the following:

CONTEXT 2 I called the guard, told him I knew that one of  $A_2$  or  $A_3$  had to be saved and that knowing the name of the one of those who would be saved would not change my belief that I would be executed, so the guard could answer my question. And so he did. Why did he agree? Because the guard had made sure that answering the question would not change my belief about being executed. To reach this goal, all he had to do was to make it clear to me that he would select with probability  $1/2$  between  $A_2$  and  $A_3$  if I was going to be executed. In such a case, the TBM analysis is reduced to a plain probabilistic analysis. One gets

$$\text{bel}(S = A_1 \mid \text{guard agrees to answer and says } S \neq A_3) = 1/3$$

The TBM and probability solution are identical, which is normal, as the probability solution corresponds to the TBM solution whenever beliefs happen to be additive.

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## 12. DECISION MAKING

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Pearl (P.1.4) raises the problem of *decision based on belief functions*. A frequent error consists in interpreting  $\text{bel}(A)$  as the maximal rate at which one would be willing to bet on event  $A$ . This interpretation concerns lower probabilities, not belief functions. In both the Shafer and TBM interpretations  $\text{bel}(A)$  provides only the strength of our belief that  $A$  is true. It does not directly claim the probability that  $A$  is true, as  $A$  may be true by chance over and above the necessity implied by  $\text{bel}(A)$ . Where *betting context* is concerned, let me refer to the paper (Smets [3]) in which I explain what *pignistic probability* is—the probability derived from my belief and used in order to bet “coherently.” Beliefs quantified by belief function analysis can be used as a basis for *rational decision making*. Once decision is involved, our belief function is transformed into an additive measure (a probability function) on the set of alternatives, and decisions are then based on these probabilities (and the utilities involved).

## Tu quoque Judea

The translation of the sandwich principle into decision theory cannot be used as a criticism against belief function analysis. The fact is, the principle is violated even within probability theory as shown by the *Newcomb paradoxes* (Eells [35], Gärdenfors and Sahlin [36]).

As an example of such a paradox, take the story of King David and Bath-sheba. King David fell in love with Bath-sheba, Uriah's wife. He could easily have sent his guards to get her but worried about the consequences of such an act. The pleasure of Bath-sheba's company had to be weighed against the risk that this iniquitous act would cause a revolt, which for him would be disastrous. So he was going to abstain when the grand vizier Seyab explained to him that revolts result from lack of charisma, not from iniquitous acts. Either a king has charisma and revolts are unlikely or he does not have charisma and revolts are likely. That he has committed iniquitous acts is irrelevant in both contexts. So why not enjoy Bath-sheba's presence? Where does the paradox come from?

**ORIGIN OF THE PARADOX** The fact is, King David was well versed in statistics and decision theory, so before deciding he collected data from a hundred previous kings on their charisma status ( $C$ ), on whether they had committed iniquitous acts ( $B$ ), and on whether there had been a revolt ( $R$ ). These data are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The utility of each act and consequences are given in Table 4.

King David's first computation is based on the probabilities given in Table 3 when he did not consider the charisma status. In that case, the expected utilities are

$$u(B) = \varepsilon - \beta \cdot \frac{26}{50} \ll u(\neg B) = -\beta \cdot \frac{19}{50}$$

As  $\beta$  is much larger than  $\varepsilon$ , King David should not send his guards to get Bath-sheba.

**Table 2.** Distribution of 100 Kings According to Charisma ( $C$ ), and Committing of Iniquitous Acts ( $B$ ), and the Occurrence of Revolt ( $R$ )

	$C$		$\neg C$	
	$B$	$\neg B$	$B$	$\neg B$
$R$	2	3	24	16
$\neg R$	18	27	6	4
	20	30	30	20

**Table 3.** Distribution of 100 Kings According to the Committing of Iniquitous Acts ( $B$ ) and Occurrence of Revolt ( $R$ )

	$B$	$\neg B$
$R$	26	19
$\neg R$	24	31

But if King David considers his charisma status (in which case the probabilities are those given in Table 2), one gets

- If King David has charisma,

$$u(B) = \varepsilon - \beta \cdot \frac{2}{20} > u(\neg B) = -\beta \cdot \frac{3}{30}$$

- If King David does not have charisma,

$$u(B) = \varepsilon - \beta \cdot \frac{24}{30} > u(\neg B) = -\beta \cdot \frac{16}{20}$$

So in both contexts, King David should send his guards and get Bath-sheba. What are we to make of this?

The *sandwich principle* questioned once already in Section 7 does not stand up to criticism within strict probability theory.

### 13 CONCLUSION

I think I have answered all of Pearl's criticisms against belief functions and therefore also against the TBM.

Pearl complains about the lack of effective procedure for deciding whether a problem can be represented by belief functions. He is right, but I would also like to have an effective procedure for deciding whether a problem can be represented by a probability function (or possibility functions, or fuzzy sets theory, etc.).

I think it is equally important to look for a procedure that could correctly describe a BF problem (see the Tweety, sprinkler, and pork-eating solutions).

**Table 4.** Utility of Each Act ( $B$  or  $\neg B$ ) and Consequence ( $R$  or  $\neg R$ )\*

$u$	$B$	$\neg B$
$R$	$-\beta + \varepsilon$	$-\beta$
$\neg R$	$\varepsilon$	0

\* $\varepsilon$  is the (positive) utility that results from Bath-sheba's company;  $-\beta$  is the (strongly negative) utility that results from revolt ( $\beta \gg \varepsilon$ ).

It is so awfully easy to be wrong. But this is, unfortunately, not specific for belief function analysis. Just consider the case where you collect the conditional probabilities on  $A$  given  $B$ , on  $B$  given  $C$ , and on  $C$  given  $A$ . Careless manipulations could easily lead to absurdity as many constraints underlying the three sets of conditional probabilities might be violated.

The comparison between belief functions and likelihood is not so enlightening. In fact, a more interesting relation exists between likelihood and possibility theory (Smets [37]).

I wish to apologize for possibly being somewhat harsh in some of my replies. I was very happy that Pearl's paper provides me with an opportunity to show how the TBM can resist assaults of that kind. Pearl's criticism, unfortunately, reflects the status of BF literature. I think the foundation of any models for quantifying belief is a very important and all too often neglected topic. To use belief function theory and Dempster's rules blindly can be very dangerous indeed. Their use must be justified by the nature of the problem to which they are applied, not by fashionable or ad hoc arguments.

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